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UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plain tiff/Appellee,

v.
SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Replacement Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order denying his motion to
enforce a plea agreement. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(b) (West 2009).
i~

INTRODUCTION
A defendant has no constitutional right to be offered a plea bargain.
And absent a guilty plea, any offer he does get has no constitutional
significance, and the prosecutor may withdraw it at any time even if the
defendant has "accepted" the offer. The court of appeals has recognized a
narrow exception to this rule where the defendant relies on the offer to his
detriment-say, by giving inculpating information or assistance to police in
a way that cannot be undone.

In this domestic violence case, defense counsel urged, and the State
offered, a plea deal. The Saturday before a Monday trial, the defendant
tentatively agreed to plead to a felony and drafted a proposal that she sent
to the prosecutor for his approval and signature. Negotiations continued
through Monday morning. Before the ple~ was signed by the parties or
presented for the court's acceptance or rejection, the prosecutor withdrew
the offer based on a conversation with the victim. Francis claimed
detrimental reliance based on what he was willing to waive by pleading
guilty and the hypothetical difficulty in getting a witness to appear at a
continued trial.

The trial court refused to enforce the parties' inchoate

agreement.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court correctly rule that the proposed plea bargain was
unenforceable?

Standard of Review.

The enforceability of a plea agreement is a

question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App
13, ,110, 17 P.3d 1153.

Q

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are necessary to
resolve this case, as it hinges entirely on case law.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary offacts. 1
Bethany C. lived with her boyfriend, Defendant Samuel Francis.
R632. One night, Bethany and Francis were sitting on their porch with their
mutual friend when Bethany and Francis began arguing. Id. During the
argument, Francis grabbed Bethany's shoulder, pushed her against a wall,
and headbutted her in the face three times. R634, 654-55. When the mutual
friend tried to calm things down, Francis told him to

II

get the fuck out"

because he was going to beat the shit out of" Bethany. R637.
II

After the friend left, Francis grabbed a butcher knife from the kitchen,
held it to Bethany's throat, and threatened to kill her. R638. He then put
the knife down and

II

full-on attacked" her, beating her head "into the

ground," hitting it with a glass, choking her, and again threatening to kill
her. R638-40.
When the victim tried to call a friend for a ride, Francis threw her
phone.

R660-62.

He then grabbed a security camera that recorded the

incident and threw it to the ground in an attempt to break it. R641.

1

Because this case is on interlocutory review, the State relies on the
preliminary hearing, reciting the facts in the light 1nost favorable to the
magistrate's bindover ruling. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 2015 UT 42, ,r2 n.2, 349
P.3d 696 (holding that on interlocutory review, appellate courts "recount the
facts as alleged and in a light most favorable to the ruling below.").
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B.

Summary of proceedings.

The State· charged Francis with five counts, all domestic violence
related: three counts of aggravated assault, third degree felonies; one count
of obstruction of justice for breaking the camera; and one count of damage
to a communication device. R84-86. The matter was set for jury trial on
Monday, June 15, 2015. R310-12.
During a pretrial conference on Friday June 12, defense counsel asked
the prosecutor for a final plea offer. R318. The prosecutor replied that
Francis could plead to a third degree felony without any agreement on
sentencing. Id. Defense counsel replied that she would convey the offer,
,_:c,

~

but Francis was unlikely to accept it. Id.
On Saturday June 13, defense counsel asked the prosecutor over the
phone if he would agree to a misdemeanor based on an alleged discovery
issue; the prosecutor declined, and insisted on a felony.

R320.

After

speaking with Francis, defense counsel emailed the prosecutor later that
day, stating that he accepted the offer "'to plead to the 3rd degree felony,
Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommended, stay
silent at sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete
recommended treatment, and restitution." R437. Defense counsel said she
would "plan on doing that Monday morning [the 15th]"-the first day of
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trial- and that she woul~ "draft the plea paperwork and send it to [the
prosecutor] for [his] approval." Id.
At 8:04 p.m. on Sunday the 14th, defense counsel emailed a proposed
statement in advance of plea and told the prosecutor to let her ·"know if [he
saw] any edits that need to be made." R443.
At 7:25 a.m. on Monday the 15th, the prosecutor·emailed back, asking
for two changes to the document, one substantive (agreement to a one-step
reduction in offense level, likely after successful completion of probation
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402), one stylistic (remove the victim's name).

Id. Before going to court, the prosecutor then spoke with the victim on the
phone, who apparently disapproved of the resolution. R432.
The prosecutor rescinded the offer less than an hour later shortly
before the parties appeared in court. Id. When the trial court took the bench
a few minutes later, defense counsel stated that she was "not ready to
proceed to trial" because she had anticipated a resolution that day, and
stated that she "would like to file a Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement"
0

as well as another Motion in Limine." R311, 321. The court requested that
the parties "meet and confer about settlement" and an "exhibit in
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question" - likely referring to the motion in limine regarding an alleged
discovery violation. 2 R311.
About forty-five minutes later, Francis rejected the State's plea offerpresumably a different one-and requested to continue the trial. Id. The
court granted the continuance and set a hearing date to allow the parties
time to brief the plea bargain and discovery issues. Id.
Francis filed two motions: (1) a motion to enforce the proposed plea
agreement and (2) a motion to dismiss the case under State v. Tiedemann
because by the time police learned of and collected video footage from
Francis's surveillance cameras, it was recorded over. R317-27, R330-46.
The trial court denied both motions after extensive argument. R691752. Regarding the plea agreement, the court ruled that the State could
"rescind the offer" at any time before the court accepts the plea. R748.
Francis timely sought interlocutory review only on the plea issue, which the
court of appeals granted.

R471-569, 588-89. The court of appeals then

certified the case to this Court. See Appellate Docket, order of October 28,
2016.

Francis has not provided a copy of the transcript of this hearing, so
the State takes its summary from the court minutes.
2
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Analogizing to contract law, Francis argues that he is entitled to
enforce the prosecutor's initial plea offer because the State made a "nonconditional, definite, and complete" offer; he unconditionally accepted it;
and he relied on it to his detriment. While some contract analogies are
helpful in plea agreement cases, the acceptance-by-the-offeree analogy is
not. For guilty pleas, only court acceptance of the guilty plea itself makes
the plea agreement enforceable between the "contracting" parties.

The

United States Supreme Court has recognized this, holding that it is only the
guilty plea-not the plea offer-that has constitutional significance. As the
trial court correctly recognized, because Francis never pled guilty, his
enforcement claim fails at the outset.
Pre-plea agreements can be enforceable where a defendant relies to
his detriment on a prosecutor's offer. But the reliance necessary to support
pre-plea enforcement arises only where the defendant's performance
materially undermines the fairness of a trial should the State back out of the
plea deal; for example, where a defendant inculpates himself in a way that
cannot be undone.
That did not happen here. Instead, plea negotiations simply failedas they often do - and Francis was placed back in the position he was in
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before negotiations began.

Nothing that happened during the plea

negotiations will make his trial unfair.

ARGUMENT
I. .
Francis is not entitled to enforce a plea agreement that the
trial court never accepted, and he did not rely on to his
detriment.

Francis argues that the prosecutor "breach[ed]" a "plea agreement"
when he withdrew his offer after Francis accepted it and relied on it.
Aplt.Br. 9. But because Francis had yet to enter a plea, there was no
enforceable agreement for the prosecutor to breach. And Francis did not
detrimentally rely on the State's offer in the only legally relevant way-the
offer did not require him to do anything and he did not do anything that
would have irreparably and materially damaged his position at trial.
A. There is no constitutional right to enforce a plea agreement
pre-plea, and a defendant does not rely on an offer to his
detriment if he can be returned to his pre-bargaining
position.

In the guilty plea context, contract analogies are helpful as far as they
go. For example, as in the civil context, Verdi Energy Grp., Inc. v. Nelson,
2014 UT App 101, if14, 326 P.3d 104, the burden of proving both the
existence of a contract and a breach of that contract is on the proponenthere, Francis. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 653 (Westlaw 2014); 5 Wayne R.
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LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure§
21.l(d), 521-22 (3d ed. 2007).
And though there is "no constitutional right to plea bargain,"

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977), if a prosecutor chooses to
offer one, and a defendant accepts it by pleading guilty, the parties
"essentially" have an enforceable contract. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 137 (2009); see generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)
(applying contract principles to plea bargains). Thus, when a defendant
pleads guilty, the prosecutor's promise made to induce that plea "must be
fulfilled." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. And when either party breaches the
contract, the non-breaching party is entitled to relief.

See id. at 262-63

(leaving remedy determination to state courts); see, e.g., State v. Patience, 944
P.2d 381, 387 (Utah App. 1997) (permitting State to withdraw from
agreement where defendant has breached).
But the contract analogy has "limits" because though plea agreements
are "like contracts," they" are not contracts." Id. at 387 (citing United States v.

Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1990) (second emphasis added)). In the
usual civil case, an offer, acceptance, and exchange of promises can be
sufficient to create a binding contract. But criminal plea agreements are
different. "A· plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional
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significance; in itself it is a mere executory agree1nent." Mabry v. Johnson,
467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984), disapproved of on other grounds by Puckett, 556 U.S. at
138 n.1; see also Executory, Black's Law Dictionary 611 (8th ed. 2004) ("Taking
full effect at a future time''; "To be performed at a future time; yet to be
completed."). This is so because plea agreements are "not simply a contract
between two parties"; rather, they "implic~te[] the integrity of the criminal
justice system and require[] courts to exercise judicial authority." United

States v. McGovern, 822 F.2d 739, 743 (8th Cir. 1987).
Unless and "until embodied in the judgment of a court," a plea
agreement "does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other
constitutionally protected interest," because the "Due Process clause is not a
code of ethics for prosecutors; its concern is with the manner in which
persons are deprived of their liberty." Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507, 511. And
"trial courts are not required to accept plea agreements." State v. Montiel,
2005 UT 48, ,I13, 122 P.3d 571 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. ll(e)); see also

Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (recognizing that there is "no absolute right to
have a guilty plea accepted" and that a "court may reject a plea in exercise
of sound judicial discretion''); see also Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (holding no binding contract where "trial judge never
accepted the plea aggrement"). Therefore, a "defendant's acceptance of a
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prosecutor's proposed plea bargain creates no constitutional right to have
the bargain specifically enforced," State v. Vixamar, 687 So.2d 300, 301 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Mabn;, 467 U.S. at 507-08), and by necessary
extension, no enforceable contract.
For this reason, defendants cannot enforce an agreement where no
plea is entered, let alone one that has never "submitted to the trial court for
approval." Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ,I,15, 10, 13-15; State v. Kay, 717 P.2d
1294, 1304-06 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) (opining that defendant was
not entitled to enforce plea agreement unless the prosecutor agreed to it
before it was presented to the court), overruling on other grounds recognized by

State v. Lovell, 2011 UT 36, ilif 48-61, 262 P.3d 803.
The vast majority of courts to address the question follow this general
rule. See United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[E]ven if
Papaleo had accepted the government's plea agreement offer, such an act,
alone, would not have created a constitutional right to have that bargain
enforced" given trial court discretion to reject plea bargain); United States v.

Wessels, 12 F.3d 746, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Savage, 978
F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[N]either the defendant nor the
government is bound by a plea agreement until it is approved by the
court."); Harden v. State, 453 So.2d 550, 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("Until
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formal acceptance has occurred, the plea binds no one: not the defendant ..
., the prosecutor, ..., or the court.") (citing cases); State v. Crockett, 877 P.2d
1077, 1079 (Nev. 1994) (same); State v. Willis, 933 P.2d 854, 858 (N.M. 1997)
(same); State v. Trepanier, 600 A.2d 1311, 1315 (R.I. 1991) ("We believe that
either the state or a defendant may withdraw from [a plea] agreement
unless and until that defendant's plea is actually entered. Prior to that time
such an agreement should not be enforceable against either party."); Reed v.

Becka, 511 S.E.2d 396, 402 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999). (" A majority of courts
addressing" this issue "have concluded that neither a defendant nor the
government is bound by a. plea offer until it is approved by the court.")
(citing cases); Metheny v. State, 589 S.W.2d 943, 945-46 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1979) (refusing to enforce plea agreement before plea accepted by court and
holding no "irremediable prejudice" to the defendant); Ex parte Williams,
637 S.W.2d 943,947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ("The 'contract' does not become
operative until the court announces it will be bound by the plea bargain
agreement."); State v. Bogart, 788 P.2d 14, 15-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)
(same). 3

To the State's knowledge, only two states-Alabama and
Maryland-enforce pre-plea agreements without irreparable detrimental
reliance. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarber, 437 So.2d 1330, 1336 (Ala. 1983)
(compelling State to re-make pre-plea offer, though not requiring trial court
to· accept it); Rios v. State, 974 A.2d 366, 374-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009)
3
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This is true even where, as ·here, the State rescinded an "accepted"
offer after consulting with the crime victim. See Miller III v. State, 1 So.3d
1073, 1076-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (refusing to enforce agreement where
defendant initially accepted State's offer but the State "soon thereafter"
rescinded after speaking with the victim); Diggs v. State, 219 S.W.3d 654,
658-60 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005) (refusing to enforce signed agreement between
parties not presented to court where prosecutor withdrew offer after
consulting victim).
The court of appeals has recognized a narrow exception to this
general rule for cases in which the defendant (1) acts in reliance on the
agreement and (2) his actions "would substantially affect a retrial." State v.

Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Utah App. 1996); Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, ,I15
("From the record before us, we find no evidence that defendants took any
action in reliance on the tentative plea agreement, and therefore, they

(holding plea agreement enforceable before acceptance by court). But their
reasoning is unpersuasive. Most glaringly, they go against the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Mabry that unaccepted pleas have no
constitutional significance. MabnJ, 467 U.S. at 507, 511. They also appear to
be attempts to enforce the very thing that MabnJ refused- best practices on
prosecutor's offices. Id. This would violate the separation of powers.
Further, the Maryland court's reasoning is arguably self-contradictory,
because the court held the pre-plea offer enforceable even while recognizing
that u An 'offer that requires a third party's approval before it becomes
effective is no offer at all." Rios, 974 A.2d at 374.
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suffered no prejudice by the trial court's unwillingness to compel the State
to honor the agreement.") (citing Moss); see also Wayne R. LaFave et al., 5

Crimin.al Procedure§ 21.2(£) (4th ed. Westlaw 2016) ("The prevailing doctrine
is that ,.the State may withdraw from a plea bargain agreement at any time
prior to, but not after, the actual entry of the guilty plea by the defendant or
other action by him constituting detrimental reliance upon the agreement.")
(citations omitted).
In other words, if, relying on the plea offer, a defendant somehow
inculpates himself in a way that cannot be undone, then he may force the
State to live up to what it promised, even though the promise has yet to
mature into a plea that a court has accepted. See Stringham, 2001 UT App 13,

if 15 (holding no prejudice where defendant took no ,.,. action in reliance on
the tentative plea agreement" and that reliance had to '" substantially affect
retrial'") (quoting Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027).
But situations meeting such an exception are rare. Stokes v.

Armantrout, 851 F.2d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 1988) (Detrimental reliance is
difficult to demonstrate in a plea bargain context.").

So long as the

defendant can be "placed in the same position as he or she was prior to the
guilty plea, there is no undue prejudice to the defendant" when the
government withdraws a plea offer after the defendant has accepted the
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offer but before a court has accepted the plea.

Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027

(citations omitted); State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1982); see also Gov't of

Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980) (refusing to compel plea
agreement where defendant was "in the same position as if he had not been
offered a plea"); United States v. McGovern, 822 F.2d 739, 744-46 (8th Cir.
1987) (similar); Metheny, 589 S.W.2d at 945-46 (holding no "irremediable
prejudice" to the defendant by placing him in pre-negotiation position).
Indeed, this is true even if a trial court initially accepts a plea. Moss,
921 P.2d at 1027-28. And mere disappointment in the loss of the bargain
does not suffice. Chapman v. State, 426 S.E.2d 9, 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding disappointment insufficient to constitute detrimental reliance);

State v. Beckes, 300 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Wisc. App. 1980) ("[T]he due process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions do not protect a defendant
against shattered expectations.").
Cases holding detrimental reliance generally involve cooperation
agreements in which the defendant takes some action - such as tendering a
confession, paying restitution, or aiding in a police sting operation-in
order to earn a particular resolution. See generally State v. Terrazas, 2014 UT
App 229, 336 P.3d 594 (discussing cooperation agreements); State v. Johnson,
360 S.W.3d 104, 109-11 (Ark. 2010) (same); see, e.g., United States v. Wells, 211
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F.3d 988 (6th Cir. 2000) (remanding for hearing on potential reliance where
defendant arguably complied with cooperation agreement terms); People v.

Fanger, 748 P.2d 1332, 1333 (Colo. App. 1987) (finding detrimental reliance
where defendant gave incriminating statement and agreed to testify against
his brother in exchange for plea deal); Doe v. Dist. Attorney, 564 N.E.2d 588,
590-91 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991) (remanding for hearing on reliance where
defendants agreed to participate in undercover operations); Moody v. State,
716 So.2d 592, 595 (Miss. 1998) (citing cases holding detrimental reliance
where defendants resigned from work position, tendered confession, or
performed undercover activity to secure pleas); Custodio v. State, 644 S.E.2d
36, 39 (S.C. 2007) (explaining that defendant may rely to his detriment on
offer by "provid[ing] beneficial information to law enforcement"); Beckes,
300 N.W.2d at 873 (citing cases explaining that defendant may rely to his
detriment where he pays restitution or acts as an informer).
But even then, if the evidence that a defendant gives is not used in
later proceedings, he cannot be said to have relied to his detriment. See e.g.,
Hall v. Al Luebbers, 341 F.3d 706, 715-16 (8th Cir. 2003) (no detrimental

reliance where defendant took polygraph but government did not seek to
ad1nit it at trial); Evans v. State, 899 So.2d 890, 894-95 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding no detrimental reliance where defendant gave confession that was
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not admitted at later trial); State v. Marlow, 432 S.E.2d 275, 280-81 (N.C. 1993)
(holding no detrimental reliance from defendant taking polygraph at State's
request prior to plea bargain revocation where the State did not intend to
use results in later proceedings). And the proposed plea itself cannot later
prejudice the defendant because it is inadmissible at trial. State v. Pearson,
818 P.2d 581, 582-83 (Utah App. 1991) (holding under rule 410, Utah Rules
of Evidence, that plea negotiations are inadmissible by either party at trial).
B.

Francis cannot enforce a plea bargain where he never pied
guilty, he was returned to his pre-bargaining position, the
reliance he asserts is illusory, and the terms were never final
at any rate.

Francis argues that he is entitled to enforce the proposed plea below
because the prosecutor made an "unconditional and definite" offer which
he "unequivocal[ly]" accepted and relied on to his detriment. Aplt.Br. 1618. The trial court properly denied him relief. Even if the prosecutor had
made a definite offer that Francis had unequivocally accepted, there was no
enforceable plea agreement because the trial court had not accepted his
plea. The reliance that Francis argues is not the kind that would justify
enforcing a plea agreement on a plea that the court had yet to accept. And
there was no definite offer or unequivocal acceptance at any rate-the
precise agreement terms were still under negotiation.
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Even if the parties had reached a "meeting of the minds'' - a point
·which the State disputes below-there would still be no valid agreement
because, as explained, "the tentative plea agreement was neither presented
to nor accepted by the trial court." Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, if 15; see also

Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507 (" A plea bargain standing alone is without
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement."). As
Francis acknowledges, all of the cases he relies on-including Patience involved "enforcement of plea terms after a defendant has already entered,
and the trial court accepted, a plea from the defendant." Aplt.Br. 13. But as
shown, without a plea, there is no agreement to enforce. Stringham, 2001 UT
App 13, if15 (refusing to enforce "tentative plea agreement" that "was
neither presented to nor accepted by the trial court.").
It is true-as Francis points out, Aplt.Br. 14-that the trial court in

Stringham would have rejected the plea agreement because it did not
address restitution. Id.

But that fact did not determine the outcome; it

merely further supported the court's holding.

Id.

Thus, contrary to

Francis's argument, Aplt.Br. 14, the absence of evidence on whether the trial
court was willing to accept the plea does not make the agreement on the
unentered plea enforceable.

It is merely a non-dispositive factual
L~

~

distinction between this case and Stringham. The dispositive fact- that the
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court had yet to accept the plea before the prosecutor revoked the offer-is
the same in both cases.
Francis also relies on State v. Bero for the proposition that "a
constitutional right to enforcement of plea agreements may arise before a
contract is reached because of reasonably formed expectations of the
defendant." Aplt.Br. 15. But this statement in Bero was pure dicta, as Bero
was not entitled to enforcement of his plea. Bero, 645 P.2d at 46-47. And
that dicta-and the Fourth Circuit case it cited in support-have been
overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Mabry, 467 U.S. at 506-07
,·::..
~

&n.2. 4

Bero cited Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979) for the
hypothetical proposition that pre-plea agreements could be enforceable.
645 P.2d at 47. Cooper was never very influential- almost every court that
cited to it did so only to reject its reasoning. See, e.g., Scotland, 614 F.2d at
364 (rejecting the "Cooper rule"); Caldwell v. State, 747 S.W.2d 99, 151-52
(Ark. 1988) (declining to follow Cooper); Cope v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.2d
703, 704 (Ky. 1983) (" Additionally, we would join those jurisdictions which
have repudiated Cooper.") (citing cases); State v. Caminitta, 411 So.2d 13, 16
(La. 1982) (" Cooper is the only case in any jurisdiction to so hold and we
reject its rationale."); State v. Collins, 265 S.E.2d 172, 176 (N.C. 1980) ("We
reject the holding in Cooper and elect to follow the decisions in other
jurisdictions" that the "State may withdraw from a plea bargain
arrangement at any time prior to, but not after, the actual entry of the guilty
plea") (citing cases); Beckes, 300 N.W.2d at 873 ("We do not find the fourth
circuit's reasoning [in Cooper] persuasive."); cf Trepanier, 600 A.2d at 1315
("We are persuaded by the opinions of those courts that have held that no
enforceable agreement has been made until the plea is entered.").
4
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Francis also argues that he relied on the offer to his detriment in four
ways: (1) by "specifically for[going] the investigation and assertion of claims
regarding alleged Brady and Tiedemann violations"; (2) by forgoing "his trial
rights" because the State requested that the trial proceed with counsel
allegedly unprepared; (3) "at least one witness" -the mutual friend-"who
appeared at the trial on June 15 would be, according to Francis, unlikely to
appear at any subsequent trial"; and (4) he must "pay the expert he retained
in this case additional monies." Aplt.Br. 17-18. This purported reliance is
not the kind that would justify enforcing an agreement on a plea that the
court has yet to accept.

That is, Francis has not shown that the plea

negotiations irreversibly damaged his ability to defend himself.
Francis did not "forgo" his Brady/ Tiedemann claims- they were fully
briefed, argued, and decided against him. (R330-46, 353-430, 690-723).
He was not forced to go to trial unprepared- as Francis admits, the
trial court granted his motion for a continuance. Aplt.Br. 18, see also R310ll. And plea negotiations that began one business day before trial was

·sut regardless of how influential Cooper was while it was good law
in the Fourth Circuit, it was overturned by Mabry. See Mabry, 467 U.S. at
506-07 & n.2 (citing Cooper as reason for granting certiorari review and
holding, contrary to Cooper, that a "plea bargain standing alone is without
constitutional significance"); see also State v. O'Lean;, 517 A.2d 1174, 1176-77
(N.H. 1986) (recognizing that Mabry overruled Cooper); Purser v. State, 902
S.W.2d 641, 648 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (same, citing cases).
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scheduled to begin could not have caused his counsel to be unprepared to
go to trial one business day later.

If counsel was unprepared, the plea

negotiations were not at fault.
As to the possible non-appearance of a witness at a hypothetical later
trial, it is not the witness's choice whether to appear- if summoned, he
must come or face contempt. Utah R. Crim. P. 14(a)(7) ("Failure to obey a
subpoena without reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of the
court responsible for its issuance."). And the witness was responsive to
subpoena, because he appeared at the scheduled trial. Plea negotiations
could not have caused Francis to relinquish access to such a witness.
And Francis does not explain why he is "required to pay the expert
he retained in this case additional monies." Aplt.Br. 18. It is certainly not
because the expert was paid to testify, because there was no trial. Calling
off a witness before they testified would seem at very least not cost
additional money, and may save money. Thus, it is not clear how the plea
offer could have caused whatever additional expenses that Francis will
allegedly incur. Because Francis could be restored to his pre-offer position,
he has not shown detrimental reliance. See Moss, 921 P.2d at 1027 (holding
that where "the defendant is simply placed in the same position as he or she
was prior to the guilty plea, there is no undue prejudice to the defendant.")
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(citations omitted). As explained, a plea offer may be withdrawn or rejected
at any time before a plea is entered.
Francis further argues that the "State must abide by the terms of its
agreement, despite the displeasure of the victim."

Aplt.Br. 19. But the

"displeasure of the victim" is the very sort of thing that trial courts are
required to take into account when deciding whether to accept plea
resolutions. See State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ifif23-39, 44 P.3d 756 (discussing
victim's rights under Utah constitution and statutes, and explaining that the

Q

victim was properly heard "at a time when he could have persuaded the
court to reject the proposed plea"). This only further illustrates that any
preliminary agreement with the prosecutor would not have bound the trial
court.
And more fundamentally, the record shows that the parties never
reached a "meeting of the minds."

Bero, 645 P.2d at 46 (holding no

enforceable agreement where "there had been no meeting of the minds
between counsel"). Francis's recitation of the proceedings below makes it
appear as if the prosecutor made a single offer, which he accepted on its
face. Id. at 16. But the record shows more extensive negotiation:
* Defense counsel requested a final offer on June 12, three
days before trial. The prosecutor offered a felony plea
without any sentencing agreement. Defense counsel
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said she would convey the offer, but Francis was unlikely
to accept it. R318.
* On the 13th, defense counsel asked for a misdemeanor
based on an alleged discovery issue, and the prosecutor
refused, insisting on a felony. R320.

* Later that day, defense counsel said that Francis agreed
to plead to the obstruction of justice count as a felony,
with various terrn.s and conditions, including a 24-month
probation period, substance abuse evaluation and
treatment, restitution, and for someone- presumably the
prosecutor-to stay silent at sentencing on jail. R437.
* In the late evening of the 14th, defense counsel sent a
statement in advance of plea-not in the record-asking
the prosecutor to let her know of "any edits that need to
be made." R443.

* On the morning of the 15th, the prosecutor responded,
saying that he would only agree to a one-step reduction
in offense level, likely following successful completion
of probation. R443.

* Before the parties signed the statement in advance of plea
and presented it to the court for acceptance, the
prosecutor revoked the off er. R432.
Thus, the prosecutor had not made an "unconditional and definite
offer" and Francis had not accepted any of the offers the prosecutor made.
Rather, at the time the prosecutor revoked the offer he had made, the parties
were still negotiating- and consequently had not reached agreement onthe level of offense, the prosecutor's duties at sentencing, and what level of
reduction Francis would be entitled to if he successfully completed
probation. Francis hardly accepted the prosecutor's offers unconditionally;

-23-

rather, he made a series of counteroffers that nullified each successive offer.

See generally Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1377
(1995) (" An offeree' s proposal of different terms from those of the offer
constitutes a counteroffer, and no contract arises unless the original offeror
accepts it unconditi_onally."). And he did not accept the prosecutor's latest
offer before it was revoked. Because there was no "meeting of the minds"
on the precise terms of the plea deal, no agreement was ever reached, even
under a pure civil contract analogy. See, e.g., State v. Nine Thousand One

Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213,216 (Utah App. 1990) ("However,
if the parties to the agreement never reached a 'meeting of the minds,' there
is no 'agreement' to be fulfilled.").

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on February 10, 2017.
SEAN D. REYES

Utah Attorney General

JOHN J. NIELSEN

Assistant Solicitor General
Counsel for Appellee
G
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IN THE UTAH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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MOTION TO ENFORCE
PLEA AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
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Case N!!.1319O8488

SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, .

The Honorable Royal Hansen

Defendant.

COMPS Now Defendant, SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, and moves the court for an Order to
enforce the plea agreement that was in place on June 13, 2015. This Motion is based on
the following:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The State has charged Francis by Amended Information with five charges: three
counts of third degree felony aggravated assault (DV), one count of third degree
felony obstruclion of justice, and one count of class B misdemeanor interruption
of a conununication device.
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2. Francis was scheduled to have a three-day trial from June 15 through June i7,
201.S.
· C'.i

~

· 3. On Friday~ June 12, 2015, a final pre-h·ial conference was·held in this matter.
DuriI1g thcit conference; the Court directed the parties to meet and confer ·.
regarding jury instructions, voir dire, an~ any outstanding evidentiary is~ues.
4. Later that Friday afternoon, Mr. ·Heiner on behalf of the State and Ms. Booth for

Francis conducted a telephone conference at approximately 2:30pm.
5. During that phone call, Booth said to Heiner, "One thing we did not do was put

the final plea offer in this case on the record this morning at the final preh·ial
conference. We will probably need to do that Monday morning. What is the final
plea offer from the State in this case? I don't think we have talked about that ii1.

some months since it appeared we were headed for b:ial."
6. Heh1er responded," the offer is the same offer that has been out there for s01ne

time: Aaron can plead to a third deg1;ee felony, 402 reduction after successful
completion of probation, 24 months supervised probation, no a_greem~nt for
recommendation of no jail at sentencing."
7. Booth then responded, "so the 3F would ~e to the agg assault?"
8. Heiner then replied, "no, I amok if he pleads to eithet the obstruction or the agg
assault, but no agreement for jail recs."
9. Booth.indicated she would relay the offer to her clieht, but that he would likely
decline it because of the felony.
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10. Heiner did not at any time during the discussion on June 12 indicate that the
offer was·no a final offer, or that it contingent on upon notice to the victim. In
fact, Heiner and Booth have had several conversations regarding plea resolutions
in this matter, and counsel for the alleged victim was involved in those .
discussions.
11. Booth and Heiner then discussed the remaining evidentiary issues and
completed the phone call.
12. Because the State~ s offer was different than any other offers that had been
extended in the case, and because the State's offer to plead to the obstruction
charge with a dismissal of the aggravated assault charges, Booth contacted her
client to relay and discuss the new offer.
13. On Saturday, June 13, 2015, Booth emailed Heiner upon discovering an
evidentiary issue, and requested Heiner contact her at his earliest convenience.

14. Heiner called Booth shortly thereafter, and the two discussed the evidentiary
issue (that is the subject of the Tiedema1m motion filed herewith). Heiner said he
would call Booth back shortly.

15. Heiner then forwarded an email to Booth with an attachment that contained new
evidence in the case, and then Heiner called Booth within minutes of forwarding
the email, at approximately 3:00pm.
16. Heiner and Booth discussed the evidentiary issue, and Booth indicated to Heiner

that she would likely need to file a Tiedemann motion and/ or motion in limine.
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Exasperated at the 11th hour discovery issue, Booth said to Heiner," Are we
r·eally going to try this case? Why don't we just resolve it?" And then Booth
proposed that since there was a late discovery issue, that the State agree to
resolve the case with a Class A misde~11eanor plea offer.
17. Heiner declined, stating his reasons for not wanting to extend that offer, and
said," Aaron [Fra!lcis] can plead to the third degree obstruction or assault, and
earn a misdemeanor, but I am not going to agree to a misdemeanor." Booth ~en
C,

vu
l

said she would get back to Heiner about the issues they had discussed.
18. Booth then discussed the evidentiary_ issues and plea offer with Francis, and at
4:30pm, Booth en~ailed Heiner and indicated that Francis had accepted the
State's offer, and that Booth would email the Statement of Defendant in Advance
of Plea to Heiner for his approval.
19. Booth then emailed the Statement of Defendant to Heiner, and sent him a text
message conforming the same and indicating that Booth would meet with
Francis at 8am Monday morning to review the Statement and prepare to enter

~
\

the plea at 8:15am when the Judge took the bench.
20. Heiner emailed Booth Monday morning at 7:25am with minor edits to the
Statement of Defendant.
21. When Booth walked into the courh·oom Monday morning just before 8:15a1n,
Heiner walked up to Booth and said, "No go, Bethany won't sign off on the
obstruction, it has to be aggravated assault."

00320
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22. Booth inquired about what Heiner was talking about, and indicated that at no
time had Heiner ever told Booth that the offer was not final, and that it was
contingent upon any acceptance or approval by the alleged victim.

23. Heiner said, "sorry, I just can't do it." at which point Booth ·indicated she didn't
have any files and was :not prepared to go forward with trial in light of the fad:
that they had a plea deal.

24. Unbeknownst to Booth, Heiner contacted the alleged victim on Saturday to
inform her that Francis had accepted a plea offer, but was not able to reach her
until Monday morning by phone.
25. Booth knew at the time Heiner extended the new plea offer on Friday, June 12,

that the victim had no legal right to preclude the plea offer from being made or
prevent the Court from accepting the plea offer.

ARGUMENT
I.

The State breached its agreement with Francis and now the Court must
compel the Government to honor the resolution.

"In interpreting a plea agreement, we rely on general principles of contract law, United

States v. Cn.chucha, 484 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007), and therefore look to the express
language in the agreem.ent to identify both the nature of the govenunent's promise and
the defendant's reasonable understanding of this promise at the time of the enhy of the
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guilty plea 11 VnnDmn, 493 F.3d at 1199. We consl:rue any ambiguities against the

government as.the drafter of the agreement.. Cachucha, 484 F.3d at 1270." 1

And in Scmtobello v. New York, the s.upreme Court recognized the importance for a
prosecutor to act fairly when negotiating and securing deals with an accused. 2 And in

United States v. Greene, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that, "Where a plea is predicated in
G
any significant degree on a promise or agreement, such promise or agreement must be
fulfilled to maintain the integrity of the plea." 3 The Tenth Circuit then further held,
"General principles of contract law govern the prosecution's obligations under a plea
agreement." 4 To determine whether a breach has occurred, courts apply a two-step
p1:ocess: (1) "we examine the nature of the government's promise;" and (2) "we evaluate
this promise in light of the defendant's reasonable understanding of the promise ... " 5
The defendant rieed only prove the underlying facts establishing the breach by a
preponderance of the evidence. 6
In applying the two-part test for determining whether the State is breaching the June
13 plea agreement, the Court can examine the nature of the State's agreement for

United St;:ites v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 518 F.3d 1208, 1212-13 (10th Cir. 2008).
San.tobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
3 United States v. Greene, No. 06-5063 (FED10) 08/16/2007 (Citing, United States v.
Greenwood, 812 F.2d 632,637 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d
512, 516 (iOth Cir. 1986)). See also, United.Stntes v. Werner, 317 F.3d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir.
2003); United States v. Brye, 146 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Sa1Ztobello, 404 U.S.
at 262).

Q
\

1

2

4

Ibid.

Wemer, 317 F.3d at 1171; Btye, 146 F.3d at 1210 (citing United Slates v. Rockwell Int'l
Corp., 124 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.1997).

5

6

0I

Id.
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Francis to plead ~o a felony obsh·uction of justice charge, and then evaluate that
agreement in light of Francis' understand~1g of the plea agreement, i.ndudi~g his .
reasonable reliance thereon.
In this case, the State, for the first time in the case on June 12, 2015, offered to dismiss
the aggravated assau~t charges in exchange for Francis' plea to obshuction of justice as a
domestic violence offense, third degree felony. The State's offer was unequivocal. And
Francis' acceptance of that offer on June 13, 2015 was also unequivocal. And, Francis
relied on that agreement with the State when he ceased h·ial preparation, called off his
witnesses, and forfeited his retainer to the expert witness in this case. Yet, the State
breached that agreement on Monday by erroneously stating that the plea agreement
was somehow voided because the alleged victim did not assent.
Francis agreed to waive his constitutional rights in exchange for the State disni.issin.g
the felony aggravated assault c~arges and the interference with a conununication
device charge. Francis has strong trial defenses, but agreed to waive those defenses and
his r!ghts for purpose of avoiding the possibility of being convicted for an aggravated
assault, which significantly limit his future educational and employment opportunities.
The State's offer, as relayed by Heiner, was not conditional, and in fact was made as a
statement of the final offer for the parties to put on the record. That fact demonsh·ates
that the State's offer was not conditional, and that Francis' reliance was reasonable.
Relying upon this agreement and other representations of the State, Francis forewent
pursuing his h"ial defenses in light of the plea agreement. Because it was clear during
the June 12 and 13 conversations that the offer was made and not conditional, the plea
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agreeinent was now enforceable. In the subsequent communications, including the
email sent by Heiner Monday morning at 7:25am containing edits to the Statement of
Defendant memorializing the plea agreement, all indicators were that the plea would be

~
I

entered imminently.
Applying the general principles of conh·ad law to the agreement between the State
and Francis, both parties will benefit from their bargained-for ·agreem~nt with the.
government's registering a conviction, procuring the probation conditions and
b-eatment of Francis, and closing one more matter on the State's caseload. Francis is
entitled to the benefit of his agreement with the State.
Further, the plea agreement is not void or voidable because the victim does not like
the resolution. Utah's victim's rights statutes do not allow for an alleged victim to void
a plea agreement. 7 hl fact, the provisions of Utah's victim's rights statutes explicitly
state that the rights of victims shall not be construed to provide a legal basis for
interference with a plea. 8

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, having the reasonable understanding that in
exchange for his plea as charged to Count Four of the Amended Information, a thfrd
degree felony to obstruction of justice (DV), his case will be resolved in a manner
favorable to both parties, respectfully moves the court to enforce said agreement, and

7

~
I

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-1, et seq., and 77-38-1, et seq.
Code Am1. §77-38-12.

a Utah
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require that the State honor the resolution that Francis negotiated with Heiner, and
accepted prior to tdal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25 th day of June, 2015.

KELLYlNN. BOOTH .
..-:

1'1.1.C

Attorney for Aaron Francis
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KELLY AN_N BOOTH (10910)

kellyann@boothlegal.com
.THE JUDGE BUILDINC
8 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 700
SALTLAKECITY, UTAI-184111-2225
(801) 364-6666 PHONE·_
(801) 618-3835 FACSIMILE

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE UTAH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE-DEPARTMENT
. STATEOFUTAH,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

-v-

Case N!! 131908488

SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS,

The Honorable Royal Hansen

Defendant.

G
'

THIS COURT, HAVING CONSIDERED the Defendant's Motion, and based on relevant law

and good ·cause appearing, hereby ORDERS:
'" The Defendant' S Motion is GRANTED. Defendant' S case should resolve as tl1e
parties agreed.
DATED this_·_ day of June, 2015.

The Honorable Royal Hansen

T1iird Judicial District Court Judge
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.CERTIFICATE of SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 25 th day of June, 2015, a ti;ue and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the.following:

Salt Lake District Atto1ney
Justice Division Broadway
111 E Broadway Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

D Hand Delivery
•D Overnight
U.S.Mail
Mail
D Facsimile
l2SJ e-filing
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· SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
Clint Heiner, Bar No. 11209
Deputy District Attorney
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (385) 468-7600
Email: cheiner(@.sJco.org
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
ENFORCE THE PLEA AGREEMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 131908488

SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS,

Honorable ROYAL HANSEN

Defendant.

The State by and through counsel, Clint Heiner, moves this Cowt to deny Defendant's

;J·

Motion to Enforce the Plea Agr~ement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between June 12 and 13, 2015, the State and Counsel for Defense engaged in plea
· negotiation discussions. Those discussions concluded with a statement by Defense Counsel that
"Aaron can not accept any felony because he has a no felony policy at work." So, whe~ on June
13, 2015, Counsel for Defendant sent the State an email tentatively accepting a felony offer
(Attachenu1t A), the State was surprised. Counsel for the State then emailed the Victim and
asked her for her number. On June 14, 2015, the State received another email from Counsel for
Defense with an attached proposed plea for review (Attachement B). On June 14, 2015, the
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State received a returned email from the Victim with her phone number; however, the state did
not call her until the following morning, because of the late hour. On the morning of June 15,

2015, the State looked at the tentative plea and sent an email to Defense Counsel (Attachemnt
C). The State then called and spoke with the Victim. After discussing the tentative plea with the
Victim, the State rescinded its offer to Defendant in Court at about 8:15 am when Counsel for
Defense appeared. The tentative plea agreement was never finalized. Counsel for Defense had
not made the changes proposed by the State. Counsel for Defense had not reviewed the plea

wit~ Defendant and neither party had signed the plea. Furthermore, the plea was never presented
to nor accepted by the trial court.
~

LAW AND ARGUMENT

I

In this case, Defendant relys upon contract law principles to seek specific performance of
the tentative plea agreement. However, although principles of contract law provide a useful
framework involving plea agreements they cannot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law
area of plea bargaining. See Patience, 944 P.2d 381,387 (quoting tJ11ited States v. Oca11as, 628
F.2d 353, 35~ (5 th Cir. 1980)). Fm1hermore, Defendant attempts to apply the wrong legal
standards to the issue at hand. Defense references cases where an agreement has been finalized
and the court has entered and accepted the plea. The case most directly on point is State v.
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13 (2001). In Stringham, before tr~al, defendants' counsel and the
State discussed a potential plea agreement. The plea agreement, however, was never finalized
between the parties, no.rwas it submitted to the trial court for approval. Defendant filed a motion
to enforce the propoS.ed plea agreement, which was denied. In Stringham, the Court of Appeals,
recognized the Utah Supreme Court's holding in. State v. Kay, stating "plea agreements are

.

'

'
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binding on the parties and the court once the plea is entered and accepted." State v. Kay. 717
P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986).
Here, both counsel for the State and Defense discussed a tenative plea agreement.
However, that plea was never finalized; through email comnnmications between Counsel for the
State and Defense: ( 1) Defendant had yet to make final confirmation of the plea, (2) Defendant

had not reviewed the plea, and (3) the plea itself had not been finalized and edits still had to be
made. Even assuming that the plea was finalized, the State rescinded the offer before it was

accepted and entered on the record. Until the plea agreement was entered and accepted by the
Court, the State is not bound by the offer. The State can rescind the offer up to the point the
Court accepts and enters the plea on the record, so long as defendant took no action that would
cause prejudice. (Strinuhamat 1157, citing State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1027 (Utah Ct. app.
1996). Defendant cannot show prejudice. "[A] plea bargain standing alone is without
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which until embodied in the
judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally ·
protected interest." (Strin!!ham quoting Mabry v. Jolmson, 467 U.S. 504 at 507 (1984)). The
State presented ready for trial on June 15, 2015. This case has been pending for nearly 2 years,
Defendant has waived his speedy trial rights a number of occasions and did so again on June 15,
2015. Any prejudice to this point is speculative and Defendant cannot show any real prejudice.
Furthermore, the ~tringhani Cotu1 noted,. "[i]n additional to being an executory
agreement, the decision whether to accept or reject a plea agreement lies within the discretion of

the trial court." (quoting State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). Furthermore,
"even where 'the government and the defendant reach a plea agreement, the court is not required
to accept it." (Stringham quoting, United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316,325 (7 th Cir. 1991)).
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Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states, "[a]t the time of entry of plea, the
prosecutor shall represent to the court, either in writing or on the record, that the victim has been
contacted and an explanation of the plea bargain has been provided to the victim ... prior to the
court's acceptance of the plea." U.R.C.P. 35
Here, even if the State and Defendant would have moved forward with the plea, the Court

by rule could have rejected it. Pdor to the State rescinding the offer, the Victim had not been
&;;)

contacted and the State had. not explained the plea bargain to her. Defendant could not

I

guarantee that the Comt would accept and enter the plea of record and should have been
prepared to go to trial.
(;j

CONCLUSION

j

The tentative plea offer was not final. Even if the plea was final; the State could rescind

the offer where Defendant suffered no actual prejudice. Therefore, there is no plea to enforce.
G.

Furthennore, the tentative plea agreement was neither presented to nor accepted by the trial
cotu1. Accordingly Defendant's motion should be denied.
DATED this 30 June 2015.
SIM GILL
District Attorney

Isl
Clint Heiner
Deputy District Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STATE'S MOTION TO
PRECLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY, was sent to the following:
Ke~ly Ann _Booth
Attorney for Defendant
8 East Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
kellyann@boothlegal.com

[
[
[
[

] U.S. Mail
] Messenger/Hand Delivery
] Facsimile
] email
fxl eFile

DATED this 30 June 2015.

Isl Clint Heiner USB P#l 1905

00435

Attachment A
@
I

@
(

@)
i

-.~

00436
@)
!

Clint Heiner·
From:
Sent:

To:
Subject:

Kelly Ann Booth <kellyann@boothlegal.com>
Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM
Clint Heiner
Re: Samuel Aaron Francis

Clint: I am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you made yesterday for him to
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at
sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution.
Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in timine/motion to continue based on the new
information we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is
to plead to the new offer.
let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and 11II draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you
Monday. Kelly Ann
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq.
The Judge Building.
8 East Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 364.6666 Telephone
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT-The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential information intended
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are hereby
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received
this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original
message. Thank you.
Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof.
Sent from my i?hone
> On Jun 13, 2015, at 2:52 PM, Clint Heiner <CHeiner@slco.org> wrote:
>
:;,
>
> Clint Heiner
> Deputy District Attorney

> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney
> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake
> City, UT 84111<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0>
>

> 801-363-7900<tel:801-363-7900>
> 801-366-4176<tel:801-366-4176> (fax)
1
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>

> CONFIDENTIAL: This electronic message - along with any/all attachments
> - is confidential. This message is intended only for the use of the
> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person
> responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you may not use,

> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender
> by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you
>
>

> Begin forwarded message:
>

> From: Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org»
> To: '"Kelly Ann Booth 111
> <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegai.com»
> Cc: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org>>
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis
11

>
> Here is the most up-to-date police report

>
> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Call

>
> <13-140510.pdf>
> <CAD call 13~140510.pdf>

~
I

2
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Clint Heiner
From:
Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Kelly Ann Booth <kellyann@boothlegal.com>
Sunday, June 14, 2015 8:04 PM
Clint Heiner
Krystal Bain; Justin Knell
Re: Samuel Aaron Francis
SIAP_Francis_20150615.pdf

Clint: Here is the Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea for the obstruction charge. I included all the terms you
indicated on Friday, so it should be good to go. I will be at court in the morning at 8am to review it with Aaron, so we will
be ready to go to enter the plea when Judge Hansen takes he bench at 8:15. Let me know if you see any edits that need
to be made, otherwise, see you in the morning. Thanks, Kelly Ann

From: Kelly Ann Booth
Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM
To: Clint Heiner
Subject: Re: Samuel Aaron Francis
Clint: I am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you .made yesterday for him to
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at
sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution.
Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in limine/motion to continue based on the new
inform.ation we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is
to plead to the new offer.
let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you
Monday. Kelly Ann
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq.
The Judge Building
8 East Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 364.6666 Telephone
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT - The information contained in this electronic mall message is confidential information intended
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are hereby
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received
this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original
message. Thank you.
Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof.

G
',

Sent from my iPhone
1
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> On Jun 13, 2015, at 2:52 PM, Cli~t Heiner <CHeiner@slco.org> wrote:
>
>
>

> Clint Heiner
> Deputy District Attorney
> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney
> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake
> City, UT 84111<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0>

>

> 801-363-7900<tel:801-363-7900>
> 801-366-4176<tel:801-366-4176> (fax}
~

~

>
> CONFIDENTIAL: This electronic message - along with anyiali attachments
> - is confidential. Thi~ message is intended only for the use of the
> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person
> responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you may not use,
> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have .
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender
> by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you
>
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>

> From: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org»
> To: "'Kelly Ann Booth'"
> <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com»
> Cc: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org»
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis
>
> Here is the most up-to-date police report
>

> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Call
>

> <13-140510.pdf>
> <CAD.call 13-140510.pdf>

2
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Clint Heiner
From:

Sent:

To:
Subject:

(iJ)

Clint Heiner
Monday, June 15, 2015 7:25 AM
'Kelly Ann Booth'
RE: Samuel Aaron Francis

It is only a 1 step reduction. Also, take alleged victim out of statement.
-----Original Message----From: Kelly Ann Booth [mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com]
Sent: Sunday, June 14, 2015 8:04 PM
To: Clint Heiner
Cc: Krystal Bain; Justin Knell
Subject: Re: Samuel Aaron Francis
Clint: Here is the Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea for the obstruction charge. I included all the terms you
indicated on Friday, so it should be good to go. I will be at court in the morning at 8am to review it with Aaron, so we will
be ready to go to enter the plea when Judge Hansen takes he bench at 8:15. Let me know if you see any edits that need
to be made, otherwise, see you in the morning. Thanks, Kelly Ann

From: Kelly Ann Booth
Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM
To: Clint Heiner
Subject: Re: Samuel Aaron Francis
Clint: I am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you made yesterday for him to
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at
sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution.
Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in limine/motion to continue based on the new
information we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is
to plead to the new offer.
let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you
Monday. Kelly Ann
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq.
The Judge Building
8 East Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 364.6666 Telephone
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT-The information contained in this electronic mail message ls confidential information intended
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are hereby
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received
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this com17:1unication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original
message. Thank you.

Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof.
Sent from my iPhone

> On Jun 13, 2015, at 2:52 PM, Clint Heiner <CHeiner@slco.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> Clint Heiner

@
I

> Deputy District Attorney
> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney
> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake
> City, UT 8411l<x-apple-data-detectors://4/0>
>
> 801-363-7900<tel:801-363-7900>
> 801-366-4176<tel:801-366-4176> (fax)

>
> CONFlqENTIAL: This electronic message - along with any/all attachments

C\

~

~ - is confidential. This message is intended only for the use of the

t

> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person
> responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you may not use,
> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender
> by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you

>
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: "Clint Heiner" <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org»
> To: "'Kelly Ann Booth
·> <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com»
> Cc: "Clint Heiner11 <CHeiner@slco.org<maHto:CHeiner@slco.org»
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis
>
> Here is the most up-to-date police report
111

>

> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Call
>
> <13-140510.pdf>

> <CAD call 13wl40510.pdf>
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KELLY ANN 1300TH (10910)

kellyann@boothlegal.com
THE JUDGE BUILDING
8 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 700
SALTLAKECITY, UTAH84111-2225

(801) 364-6666 PHONE
(801) 618-3835 FACSlMILE

A.ttoruey for Defendant
IN THE UTAH DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,

-vSAMUEL AARON FRANCIS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDU1V1 FURTHER
SUPPORTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE
PLEA AGREEMENT

Case N! 131908488
The Honorable Royal Hansen

. Co~rns Now Defendant, SAMUEL AARON FRANCIS, and files this Memorandum Further

Supporting Defenda.nt's Motion to. Enforce Plea Agreement.

RESPONSE TO ST A TE' S ST A TEMENT OF FACTS
1. "Between June 12 and 13, 2015, the State and Counsel for Defense engaged in.
plea negotiation discussions. Those discussions concluded with a statement by Defense
Counsel that 11 Aaron can not (sic) accept any felony because he has a no felony policy at
work."
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a. Response: The State and Francis did not II engage in plea negotiation
discussions/' Francis told the State that they had failed to place the final :
plea offe~ on the record at the final pre-trial that morning, a11d needed to
do that at rrial Monday morning. Francis then inquired what the State's
final offer was, and the.State extended a new offer that included dismissal
· ·.. of all the Aggravated Assault felony charges. Francis' s counsel did reply
that she did not believe Aaron would accept the offer because he has a no
felony policy at worki however, Francis' counsel clearly indicated to the
State that, since there was a new offer that in~luded dismissal of the
Aggravated Assault charges, she was ethically obligated to convey the
offer to Francis and would get back to the State with his answer. The State
did not indicate at any time that the offer was tei1tative, or subject to
approval by anyone. That was the State's final stated plea offer, the one

G
I

that the parties "should have" put the r~cord in open court as the final
plea offer to Francis for him to accept or reject.
2. "So, when on June 13, 2015, Counsel for Defendant sent the State an email

tentatively accepting a felony offer (Attachemnt (sic) A), the State was surprised."
a. Response: While Francis does not dispute that the State was surprised, the

~
I

email accepting the offer was not tentative. It read in relevant part, "he is
accepting the plea offer you made yesterday for him to plead to the 3 rd
degree felony, Obstruction of Justice-DV, with 24 month probation

00448

recommend, stay silent at sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval an.d
complete recommended treahnent, and restitution .. .let's plan on doing·
that Monday mon1ing, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to
· you for your approval." 1 Despite ample opportunity to hit "reply" to
Francis' email, at no time did the State respond to Frnncis and indicate
that he needed to get approval from anyone, or that he had not notified
the alleged victim in this case. In fact, when the State did reply to the
subsequent email from Francis containing the Statement of Defendant in
Advance of Plea, the State's only response was to make minor edits to the
document.
3. "Counsel for the State then emailed the Victim and asked her for her number."
a. Response: The State could have emailed Francis if it had concerns that the
plea offer had not been discussed with the alleged victim. It was clear
from Francis' email that the offer was accepted and that Francis was
anticipating entering the plea on Monday morning. It was also clear from
Francis' acceptance email that the basis for the acceptance of the plea was
to avoid asserting and litigating certain defenses and evidentiary issues
that had been brought to light on June 13, and that Francis was actually
foregoing his defenses and claims in order to take advantage of the new
1

Email from Booth to Heiner dated June 13, 2015 at 4:31pm (a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit A).
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plea offer. These facts demonsh·ate there was likely a duty at that point for
the State to inform Francis that it viewed the offer as "tentative," if it did,
in fact, view it as such at that point.
4. "On June 14, 2015, the State received another email from Counsel for Defense

with an attached proposed plea for review (Attachement (sic) B)."
C:,
~

a. Response: The attached Statement in Advance of Plea outlined all the
terms of the plea agreement, as offered by the State and accepted by
Francis. Despite confirmation in that email that the plea was accepted by
Francis, and an actual document created in performance of the agreement,
the State still did not respond to that email and indicate that the plea offer
was "tentative" or conditional.
5. "On June 14, 2015, the State received a returned email from the Victim with her

phone number; however, the state (sic) did not call her until the following
morning, because of the late hour."
a. Response: None.
6. "On the morning of June 15, 2015, the Stat~ looked at the tentative plea and sent

an email to Defense Counsel (Attachenmt (sic) C)."

a. Response: The State's email made minor edits to the plea agreement, and
again did not indicate in any way that the plea was "tentative" or that the
parties Ii1ay not enter the plea that morning.
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7 .. "The State then called and spoke with the Victim. After discuss~1g the tentative
plea· with the Victim, the State rescinded its offer to Defendant in Court at about
8:15am when Counsel for Defense appeared."
a. Response: Other than disputing thatthe plea was "tentative", no further

response.
8. "The tentative plea agreement was never finalized. Counsel for Defense had not
made the changes proposed by the State."
a. Response: Counsel did make the changes by interl:ineation to the

Agreement since they were minor edlts, and not substantive changes. TI1e
plea agreement was finalized on June 13 when Francis accepted the State's
unequivocal offer, and relied on that agreement when he forewent
investiga~on and assertion of evidentiary claims and defenses, as well as
his trial rights.

9. "Counsel for Defense had not reviewed the plea with Defendant and neither
party had signed the plea. Furthermore, the plea was never presented to nor
accepted by the trial court."
a. Response: Counsel had absolutely reviewed the plea agreement with

Francis, and the State is correct that no one had signed the agree~nent yet,
because the State unilaterally breached the agreement and rescinded its
plea. The plea was presented to the Court, but it has not yet been
accepted.
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ARGUMENT
Disposition. of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the process, but a
highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and largely final disposition of most
criminal cases ... This phase of the process· of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant
what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will van;, but a constant
factor is tlrnt whelz a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or considerati.on, such promise
must be fulfilled.Z
I.

~
!

US and Utah caselaw indicates that the Court should apply contract law
principles in determining where there was an enforceable agreement
between the State ancl Francis.

"Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,
have referred to plea agreements as contract and have applied principles from contract
law to plea agreements." 3 The Utah Supreme Court has articulated specifically,
[t]he nature of plea bargains requires the exchange of consideration, allowing theparties involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement. A plea bargain is a
contractual relationship in which consideration is passed. 4

~
I

The State correctly quoted the Court of Appeals in Patience when it stated,
"[h]owever, although principles of contract law provide a useful framework involving
plea agreements they ca~ot be blindly incorporated into the criminal law area of plea

2

Santobello v. New Yorlc, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971).

3

State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,386 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404

~
I

U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
4

State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 895-96 (Utah 1988)(intemal citations and quotations
omitt~d).

"
I
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bargaining." 5 Yet it failed to include the immediately following sentences in that
paragraph whichmake clear that the application of contract law principles should be
more broadly applied in the plea bargahi context, not more narrowly as the State
suggests. Patience goes on to hold,
In applying contract law principles to plea agreements, courts must keep in 1nind
that the defendant's underlying contract right is constitutionally based and
therefore reflects concerns that differ fundamentally from and run wider th.art
those of commercial contract law. As a result, the application of contract law
principles to plea agreements may require tempering in some instances. For
example, in interpreting plea agreements or determining their validity, court
may in certain circumstances hold the government to.a higher standard than the
defendant. 6
TI1e central holding in Patience was that the State could not rely on strict application of
contract law principles to deny the defendant her due process rights or invalid her plea
agreement in its entirety. The State in that case was seeking to set aside her entire plea
and require the defendant to face h:ial on the charges anew where she was seeking
specific performance under the agreement. This holding stands for the opposition
proposition than the State suggests, and further undermines its argument to invalidate
its plea agreement.

5 State's
6

Response to Defendant's Motion to Enforce The Plea Agreement at 2.

State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 387 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).

~7~
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· The C6urt' s. holding in Patience is premised upon the Utah

line of cases interpreting
.

the United States Supreme Court's holdings regarding plea: agreements in Santobello 7
and Mnbry. 8 Accordingly, "[a] defendant may also be entitled to enforcement of his or
her plea agreement on the basis of a reasonably formed expectation," 9 including specific
performance. IO

@
I

Thus, the Court should apply contTact law principles broadly to the facts of this plea
agreement, and find that the State made a definite plea offer, that was unequivocally
accepted by Francis, and he relied upon that agreement (consideration) in foregoing
some defenses and evidentiary claims.

A. The State's plea offer was not ntentative," it was definite in its tenns and
communicated with.out caveat or condition.
The State's definite, final plea offer was extended to ·Francis on June 12, when Heineitold Booth, "Aaron can plead to a third degi-ee felony, 402 reduction after successful
completion of probation, 24 months supervised probation, no agreement for
recommendation of no jail at sentencing." The State does not directly dispute that fact,
but rather alleges that the State and Francis engaged in "plea negotiation discussions."
Yet that is simply incorrect. The State's offer was a specific response to Francis'

7

Snntobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).

8

Mnbry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).

9

State v. Nine'Thousand One Hundred Ninety~One Dollars, 791 P.2d 213 (Utah
Ct.App.1990).

".

rn State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222.

Ci,
I
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statement that the parties had failed to place _on the record the final offer in this case, to
meet the requirements of Missouri v. Frye. That the State provided its last plea offer iI1 ·
the case is evidence that the parties were not engaged in plea negotiations.
·The plea offer from the State was clear, unconditional, specific, and complete in
its terms. Tne State does not dispute that the offer, as stated by Francis in his
memorandum, was made. Francis' counsel clearly indicated to the State that, since there
was a new offer that included dismissal of the Aggravated Assault charges, she was
ethically obligated to convey the offer to Francis and would get back to the State with
his answer.
In fact, Francis did respond to the State not more than 24 hours later, with a clear
acceptance of the offer. Francis' cow1sel said, "he is accepting the plea offer you made
yesterday for him to plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obsb·uction of Justice-DV, with 24
month probation recommend, stay silent at sentencing on jail, substance abuse eval and
complete recommended treatment, and restitution." 11
Accordingly, because the State's plea offer was unconditional and definite, and
Francis' acceptance was unequivocal, the Court must enforce the agreement if it
determines there was consideration or reliance upon the agreement by Francis;
prejudicial.
B. F1·ancis relied upon tlte plea agreement and was p1·ejudiced by the State's

improper rescission.
11

Email from Booth to Heiner dated June 13, 2015 at 4:31pm (a copy of which is
attached.hereto as Exhibit B).
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TI1e State's argument that it can rescind its offer up to the point the Court accepts and
enters the plea on the record is inconect, and not bas.ed on Utah or Federal Court
authority. In fact, under Utah law, "[a] defendant may also be entitled to enforcem.ent of
his or her plea agreement on the basis of a reasonably formed expectation," 12 including
specific performance. 13 And, "courts will generally only allow the State to unilaterally
rescind a plea agreement by showing that facts analogous to those warranting a 1nistrial
exist or by showing that the defendant has breached the agreement. 1114
In this case, Francis specifically forewent the investigation and assertion of
claims regarding alleged Brady and Teidemnnn violations. Francis also forewent his trial
rights inasmuch as he presented himself on the day of h·ial without the benefit of
counsel whom could provide effective assistance; F1·ancis' counsel did not have any files
or trial materials necessary to present a trial defense because the State induced Francis
and his counsel to stop their trial preparations, call off wib.1esses, and forego claii:ns and
defenses relating to evidentiary issues discovered on June 13.
The prejudiced is further demonstrated by the State's objection to Francis'
request to continue trial in light of the State's breached plea agreement. The State
specifically sought to have Francis go forward without the benefit of effective assistance

12

State v. Nine Thousand 011.e Hundred NinehJ-One Dollars, 791 P.2d 213 (Utah
Ct.App.1990).

13

State v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1984).

14

Patience, 944 P.2d at 387 (internal quotations and citations omi~ed).

~
I
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of counsel caused by the inducement of the State to enter the plea agreement. That the
Court did not grant the State's request does not alleviate the prejudice suffered by
Francis.
Moreover, at least one witness who appeared at the trial on June 15 is likely to
fail to appear at any subsequent trial in this matter. Robert Packer stated to Francis'
counsel in the hallway on the morning of h·ial that he "did not want to be here" and did
II

not think he was going to come back." The prejudice to Francis is clear. The witness
appeared on the day of trial for which, but for the State's actions, would have gone
forward and the wih1ess could have testified. Further, Francis is now in a position
where he is required to pay the expert he retained in this case additional monies
because of the State's actions; Dr. Beall was called off when the plea agreement was
reached on June 13. And, again, the State prejudiced Francis by insisting on going
forward to trial that morning.
Had the Cow·t had the benefit of the briefing on June 15, and a fair appraisal of
the facts regarding the plea agreement and subsequent breach, the Court would have
enforced the agreement, finding that Francis would be prejudiced by going forward
after reliance on the State's agreement.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, SAMUEL AAR(?N FRANCIS,

having the reasonable uhderstanding that in

exchange for his plea as charged to Count Four of the Amended Information, a third
degree felony to obstruction of justice (DV), his case will be resolved in a manner

--11,..,,
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favorable to both parties, respectfully moves the court to enforce sai4 agreement, and
require that the State honor the resolution that Francis negotiated with Hejner, and
@

accepted prior to. h·ial.
RESPECT~ULLY SUBMITTED

I

this

7Lh

day of July, 2015.

KELLYCXNN

I~

~l

BOOTH
rt.LC

Attorney for Aaron Francis
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Kelly Ann Booth
. From:

Sent:
To:

Subject:.

Kelly Ann Booth
Saturday, June 13, 2015 4:31 PM
Clint Heiner
Re: Samuel Aaron Francis

Q
'

·Clint: 1am waiting on final confirmation from Aaron, but he is accepting the plea offer you made y1;sterday f~r him to
plead to the 3rd degree felony, Obstruction
Justice-DV, with 24 month probation recommend, stay silent at
sentencing on jail, substa_r,ce abuse eval and complete recommended treatment, and restitution.

of

Because of the new information we learned yesterday and today, and the new offer to plead to obstruction, my
assessment is that if we can't prevail on a teidemann motion/motion in limine/motion to continue based on the new
information we learned yesterday and today, and we have to go forward to trial without the video, the better option is
to plead to the new offer.

@
I

let's plan on doing that Monday morning, and I'll draft the plea paperwork and send it to you for your approval. see you
Monday. Kelly Ann
Kelly Ann Booth, Esq.
The Judge Building
8 East Broadway,. Suite 700
Salt Lake 'city, UtaM 84111
{801) 364.6666 Telephone
(801) 618.3835 Facsimile
PRIVILEGE STATEMENT -The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential information intended
only for the use of the individual or entity named above, and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the
intended recipient, the employee, or the agent responsible to deliver itto the intended recipient, you are hereby
notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received
this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801-364-6666), and delete the original
message. Thank you.
·
·

G.i
'

Any communication or offer of settlement contained in this electronic mail message is subject to Rule 408 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence and Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and is subject to the limitations thereof.
Sent from my iPhone

GJ
(

. .
.
> On Jun 13, 2015, at 2:52 PM, Clint Heiner <CHeiner@slco.org> wrote:
>

> .

>
> Clint Heiner
> Deputy District Attorney

~

(

> Office of the Salt Lake County District Attorney

> 111 East Broadway, Suite 400<x-app.le-data-detectors://4/0> Salt Lake
> City, UT 84111<l<-apple-data-detectors://4/0>
>

> 801·363-7900<tel:801-363-7900>
> 801-366-4176<tel:801-366-4176> (fax)
>
> CONFIDENTIAL: This electro.nic message - along with any/all attachments
l

00460

> - is confidential. This message is intended only for the use of the
> addressee. If you are not the intended recipient or the person
> responsible to deliver it to the intende~ recipient, you may not use,
> disseminate, distribute or copy this communication. If you have
> received this message in error, please immediately notify the sender
> by reply electronic mail and delete the original message. Thank you

>
>
> Begin forwarded message:

>
> From: "Clint Heiner'' <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org»
> To: '"Kelly Ann Booth"'
> <kellyann@boothlegal.com<mailto:kellyann@boothlegal.com»
> Cc: "Clint Heiner' <CHeiner@slco.org<mailto:CHeiner@slco.org»
> Subject: FW: Samuel Aaron Francis
>

> Here is the most up-to-date police report
>
> 52 pages. I attached a copy of the report and the CAD Ca II
>

~

> <13-140510.pdf>.
> <CAD call 13-140510.pdf>

2
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CERTIFICATE of SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 7th day of July, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served. by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

D Hand Delivery

Salt Lake Disb·ict Attorney
Justice Division Broadway
111 E Broadway Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

0

U.S. Mail

D Ovenlight Mail
D Facsimile
IZJ e-filing
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Addendum B

Addendu1n B

1

tempering goes in favor of the State.

2

in favor of the defendant.

It says the tempering goes

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MS. BOOTH:

Thank you, Judge.

5

THE COURT:

I appreciate your help.

Thank you.

Let's see, Counsel,

6

with regard to the motion to enforce the plea agreement, the

7

Court's not in a position to grant that motion,

8

rejects it,

9

Court in this circumstance.

10

and in fact

finding that the plea had not been accepted by the

The plea had not been entered of record.

The victim

11

had not been consulted with regard to a potential plea, and the

12

Tiedemann motion had not been heard at that juncture, that as I

13

look at the State has the ability to rescind an offer before it's

14

accepted and enter a record.

15

Court or entered of record, either one.

16

The plea agreement

Here it was not accepted by the

the State's not bound by that

17

until there is an acceptance.

18

and to the point that the Court accepts the offer and enters the

19

plea of record, neither of which took place here.

20

that,

21

I think we're in the position of getting this matter -- are we

22

ready for trial?

23

case and going forward?

Based upon

the Court's not able to enforce the plea agreement, and so

24
25

The State can rescind the offer up

Is that what you' re telling me, Counsel, on the

MR. HEINER:
in front

of

Yes, Judge.

I believe we have a pie-trial

Judge Shaughnessy the week prior to trial.

I don't

-59-
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